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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction

in this matter

pursuant to § 78-2-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in failing to
set aside the Default Judgment entered against Appellant Douglas M.
Baum

(hereafter Baum) in favor of Appellee Toby Slingerland

(Slingerland)

under

the

circumstances

of

Baum's

mistaken

understanding of the situation and excusable neglect at the time
the Default was entered and in light of the fact that Slingerland
did not claim prejudice should the Default be set aside.
The

standard

of

review

is

whether

or

not

under

the

circumstances the trial court abused its description in denying
Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment. Birch
V. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989).

RULES AND STATUTES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OF THE
ISSUES SET FOR REVIEW
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (set forth in the
Addendum).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is a personal injury claim filed by Slingerland
against Baum resulting from a one-car rollover causing serious
injury to Slingerland.

Slingerland filed his action against Baum

on January 31, 1992 (R. 2-4), and a Default was entered against
Baum on May 18, 1992 (R. 9). On June 16, 1992, a hearing was held
1

on the issue of damages, as a result of which a Default Judgment
was

entered

(R. 17-19).

against

Baum

in

the

amount

of

$5,623,839.00.

On September 11, 1992, Baum filed a timely Motion to

Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment.

(R. 169-170).

Subsequent to Memoranda having been filed and reviewed by the
court, the court denied Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default.
(R. 207, 218-220).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

June 1, 1991—Baum and Slingerland made a late night trip

from Salt Lake City to Wendover, Nevada. Both Baum and Slingerland
had gone a substantial period of time without sleep prior to their
return trip to Salt Lake City and both were very tired.
Slingerland

mutually

decided

to

have

Baum

drive

Baum and

back home.

Slingerland put his seat back, took off his seat belt, and went to
sleep. Shortly before the accident Slingerland woke up, noted that
Baum had fallen asleep, yelled at Baum, Baum over-corrected his
steering, the vehicle went down a ravine, and rolled causing injury
to Slingerland.
2.

(R. 0256-0257).

Shortly after the accident Baum contacted USF&G Insurance

Company (USF&G) notifying them of the accident and requesting
coverage.

USF&G informed Baum that they would not cover this

accident. (R. 177).
3.

January 31, 1992—Slingerland filed a lawsuit against

Baum seeking damages for injuries sustained
(R. 2-4).

2

in the accident.

4.

Baum had never before been involved in any litigation,

was unsophisticated in connection with legal matters and did not
have a very good understanding of how the legal process works.
(R. 177).
5.

Baum discussed the matter of the lawsuit with an attorney

who informed him that under the circumstances, Baum was probably
liable and that his best option may be to file bankruptcy.

Baum

also spoke to Slingerland's attorney and as a result of such
conversations

was

of

the

impression

and

understanding

that

Slingerland's attorney would try to work things out with Baum's
insurance company to satisfy Slingerland's claim.
6.

Subsequently,

Complaint.

Baum

was

served

with

(R. 177).
a

Summons

and

Baum did not inform anyone concerning service of the

Summons and Complaint due to the fact that Baum was of the
understanding that he had no insurance coverage and therefore, no
viable options, and due to the emotional stress of being sued by
his best friend who was now a paraplegic.

As a further result of

discussions with an attorney and Slingerland#s attorney, Baum was
in a confused state of mind and did not know what he should do.
Under the circumstances, as a result of a mistake in judgment and
excusable neglect, Baum took no action to respond to the Summons
and Complaint.

(R. 177).

7.

May 18, 1992—Default was entered against Baum.

8.

June 16, 1992—Subsequent

Default Judgment was entered
$5,623,839.

to a two-hour hearing, a

against Baum

(R. 234-313, and R. 17-19).
3

(R. 9).

in the amount of

9.

Shortly before the hearing of June 16, 1992, USF&G, which

was in the process of preparing for a declaratory action on the
issue of coverage for Baum, was informed that a Default had been
entered against Baum and that a hearing would be held on the issue
of damages.

USF&G retained the services of Gary Johnson who

appeared at the hearing of June 16, 1992 on behalf of USF&G, to
monitor the hearing. Mr. Johnson did not take part in the hearing.
(R. 237-238).
10.

July 9, 1992—A Declaratory Action was filed in the

United Stated District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. 2-92-CV611J concerning the issue of insurance coverage for Baum in
connection with the accident.
11.

September 11, 1992—Counsel had been retained for Baum by

USF&G and a Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment
was filed with an accompanying Memorandum of Authorities and
Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum.
12.

(R. 169-170, 171-175, and 176-179).

Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default

Judgment was based upon the fact that Baum took no action to
prevent judgment to be entered against him due to his emotional and
confused state and his mistaken understanding that he had no viable
options at the time. Baum in the furtherance of justice and equity
requested that the Default be set aside and that he be given the
opportunity to defend the issue of sole liability and the damage
claims.
13.

(R. 169-170, 171-175, and 176-179).
September

22, 1992—

Slingerland

filed a Memorandum

opposing setting aside the Default, asserting claims and arguments
4

against USF&G and not Baum, as a basis for opposing setting aside
the Default.
14.

(R. 180-196).

Slingerland in his Motion opposing setting aside the

Default, did not claim that he would be prejudiced should the
Default be set aside.
15.

(R. 180-196).

September 28, 1992—Baum filed a Response Memorandum in

support of setting aside the Default. (R. 197-201).
filed a Request for Hearing on the matter.
16.

(R. 202-203).

October 19, 1992—The court denied Baum's Motion to Set

Aside the Default and Default Judgment.
Baum's Request for Oral Argument.
17.

Baum also

October

21, 1992—Baum

The court also denied

(R. 0207).
filed a Rule 52 Motion and

Objection in connection with the proposed Order seeking entry of
specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, requesting that
the court provide further details as to what facts and law the
court relied on in its denial of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside
the Default and Default Judgment.
18.

(R.210-211).

December 1, 1992—The court signed an Order denying

Baum's Objection to the proposed Order and request for entry of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
19.

(R. 217-219).

December 21, 1992—Baum filed the Notice of Appeal.

(R.-221).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is a well established principle of law that justice
requires both sides of a controversy to have a fair opportunity to
be heard.

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
5

recognizes

that

at

times

Defaults

will

be

entered

under

circumstances where justice dictates and requires that the Default
be set aside.

In this case, the trial court abused its discretion

in failing to set aside the Default.

The Motion to Set Aside the

Default and Default Judgment was timely made.

Baum's mistaken

understanding, confusion and emotional distress at the time the
Default was entered constitutes grounds as mistake or excusable
neglect under Rule 60(b) to set the Default aside.

Plaintiff did

not claim prejudice should the Default be set aside.

Baum has a

good faith defense that Slingerland's injuries are not 100 percent
the fault of Baum and that Slingerland should be responsible for
his proportionate share of fault.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DESCRIPTION
IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST
DOUGLAS M. BAUM
POINT I
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WAS TIMELY FILED
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
a Motion to Set Aside a Default and Default Judgment which was
entered due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect must be
filed not more than three months after the Judgment was entered.
The Default Judgment in this matter was entered on June 16, 1992.
The Notice of Appeal was filed on September 11, 1992, within the
required 90 days.

6

POINT II
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS ARE IN DISFAVOR AND DO
NOT MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE
The courts in Utah have traditionally disfavored the entry of
Judgments by Default for the obvious reason that both sides of the
controversy have not been heard.

Entry of Judgment by Default

denies a defendant the chance to present his side of the story, to
present

a

defense, and

to

fairly

and

equitably

examine

a

plaintiff's damage claims.
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Larsen Contractor,
Inc.P 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975), the court held:
. . . But it is even more important to keep in
mind that the very reason for the existent of
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity
to be heard and to do justice between them.
In conformity with that principle the courts
generally tend to favor granting relief from
default
judgments where
there
is any
reasonable excuse unless it will result in
substantial prejudice or injustice to the
adverse party. (Emphasis added).
In Heathman v. Fabin & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190, 14 Utah
2d 60 (Utah 1962), the court held:
Judgments by default are not favored by the
courts nor are they in the interest of justice
and fair play. No one has an inalienable or
constitutional right to a judgment by default
without a hearing on the merits. The courts
in the interest of justice and fair play
favor, where possible, a full and complete
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of
every case.
In May v. Thompsonf 677 P.2d

1109

(Utah 1984), a case

involving an 18 year old defendant who also, through some confusion
and mistake, allowed a Default Judgment to be entered against him,
the court held:
7

We are aware also of a principle that if
default is issued when a party genuinely is
mistaken to a point where, absent such
mistake, default would not have occurred, the
equity side of the court would grant relief.
. • . We are of the opinion that the ends of
justice require an opportunity for the
defendant to have his day in court.
In Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981), the
court held:
The decision to relieve a party from a final
judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is subject to the
discretion of the trial court. But discretion
should be exercised in furtherance of justice
and should incline toward granting relief in a
doubtful case to the end that the party may
have a hearing.
Warren v. Dickson Ranch
CompanyP 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).
We reiterated in Olsen v. Cummings, Utah, 565
P.2d 1123 (1977), the statement made by the
court in Mayhem v. Standard Gilsonite Companyf
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962) that "it is
quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of
discretion to refuse to vacate a default
judgment
where
there
is
reasonable
justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear and timely application is
made to set it aside." . . . We hold that the
lower court abused its discretion in refusing
to set aside the default judgment under the
circumstances
presented
in
this
case.
(Emphasis added).
Under the circumstances of this case, justice and equity
demand that the Default be set aside and that Baum be allowed to
have his day in court. At the time the Default was entered, Baum
was a young man 22 years of age with no experience in the legal
system. He was suffering emotional distress, due to being sued by
his best friend who was now paraplegic as a result of an automobile
accident in which Baum was the driver.

Baum was in a state of

confusion, partly as a result of conversations with attorneys, one
8

of whom advised him that he had little option but to declare
bankruptcy, and SIingerland's attorney who advised him that action
was being taken with USF&G on the issue of coverage and payment of
Slingerland's claim.

Previously, he had been informed by USF&G

that they would not cover him in connection with this accident and
he certainly did not think he could provide his own defense. It is
not difficult to see that at the time, Baum mistakenly felt that he
had no options, but to do nothing.
under

the

Appellant

circumstances
respectfully

Baum's confused state of mind

constitutes

"excusable

submits that Rule

neglect."

60(b) was

intended

specifically for persons such as Baum who, because of their
inexperience

and

confusion, mistaken

judgment

and

excusable

neglect, have allowed a Default Judgment to be entered against
them, but where

equity

and

justice

favor

allowing

such

as

defendant, who has made a timely request to set the default aside,
to have his day in court.
It is important to note that the court's basis for denying
Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment was
that:
All concerned were aware of the proceedings,
or reasonably could have been with proper
attention . . . (R. 0207).
Appellant respectfully submits that the court's Ruling is in
error. The fact that a defendant was aware of the proceedings and
in hindsight "could" have responded, can be equally applied to
every party seeking to set aside a Default.

Under the trial

court's standard, (the fact that a defendant was aware of a pending
9

Complaint and "could" have responded,) no Default would ever be set
aside and Rule 60(b) would become meaningless.
Although Baum arguably "could" have taken action to prevent '
the entry of Default, the fact remains that he did not take any
action due to his emotional state and confusion and to his mistaken
understanding of the situation which, under the circumstances,
constitute excusable neglect within the intent of Rule 60(b).

POINT III
PLAINTIFF WILL NOT BE PREJUDICED IF
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Larsen Contractor,.
Inc.P infra, the court stated in part:
. . . Courts generally tend to favor granting
relief from default judgment where there is
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result
in substantial prejudice or injustice to the
adverse party. (Emphasis added).
It is significant to note that at no time in plaintiff's
Memorandum Opposing Setting Aside the Default did Slingerland claim
or allege or offer any evidence of "prejudice" should the Default
be set aside. (R. 180-196). It would be improper and untimely for
Appellee to raise the issue of prejudice for the first time now on
Appeal.
POINT IV
BAUM HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
TO SLINGERLAND'S CLAIM
Although this court has held that the merits of a case should
not be an issue in a Motion to Set Aside a Default (Board of
10

Education v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963) and
Larsen v. Collinaf 684 P.2d

52 (Utah 1984)), it should be noted

that Baum does have a meritorious defense that justice require he
be allowed to present. The fact is that both Baum and Slingerland
had been out late at night and without sleep for a substantial
period of time on a trip to Wendover. As a result of this activity
and outing, Slingerland and Baum were both very tired and by mutual
decision decided

to return home without any rest or sleep.

Slingerland had been angry that in the past he was always having to
drive his car and insisted on this trip that Baum do the driving.
(R. 0256-0257).

Instead of taking steps to assist Baum in staying

awake, Slingerland took off his seat belt, put his seat back, and
went to sleep. As he woke up and noticed that Baum had apparently
fallen asleep, Slingerland exacerbated the situation by yelling,
thus apparently startling Baum, resulting in Baum over-correcting
in attempting to keep the vehicle under control which resulted in
the accident and injuries to Slingerland.
Baum should be given the opportunity to have a jury assess the
relative fault of Baum and Slingerland in their mutual decision to
spend a considerable amount of time staying awake, their mutual
decision to drive back to Salt Lake from Wendover without sleep and
to weigh the subsequent actions of the parties, which eventually
resulted in the accident causing Slingerland's injuries.
Further, as to economic damages and future medical care, the
court based its $4.6 million special damages award on the brief
testimony of Paul Randle (R. 0242-0252) which was accepted without
11

significant inquiry by the court and without any cross-examination.
Finally, Slingerland's

serious

injury

likely

would

not have

occurred had he been wearing his seat belt.
Justice and equity require that Baum be given an opportunity
to provide a defense to this claim to have the jury assess the
relative

fault of the parties, and to appropriately

examine

Slingerland's damage claims.
POINT V
SLINGERLAND'S ATTACKS AGAINST
USF&G WERE IMPROPER
In response to Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and
Default

Judgment,

Slingerland

filed

a

Memorandum

entitled

"Memorandum in Opposition to USF&G/s Motion to Set Aside Default
and Default Judgment."

(Emphasis added).

Slingerland then argues

in his Memorandum that "USF&G" has failed to meet the requirements
necessary to set aside a Default, that "USF&G" has not met its
burden to show that the Default was entered as a result of a
mistake, etc., that "USF&G's" Motion was untimely, that "USF&G" has
failed to meet its burden to show that Baum has a meritorious
defense,

and

that

"USF&G"

has

failed

to

meet

any

of

the

requirements necessary to set aside a Default under Rule 60(b)(7).
(R. 180-196).

Slingerland then argues that "USF&G's" attorney,

Gary Johnson, appeared at the damages hearing of June 16, 1992,
that "USF&G," therefore, had the opportunity to participate in the
damage hearing and refused to do so.

12

This line of argument is a classic example of setting up and
then knocking down a "straw man."

The Motion to Set Aside the

Default was filed by Baum not USF&G. USF&G was not a party to that
Motion, nor did it have any involvement in that Motion other than
retaining counsel for Baum, presumably under its obligations to
defend its insured even when there is a dispute as to coverage.
Slingerland, in his Memorandum, continually attacks "USF&G" in
connection with setting aside the Default and for its failure to
affirm

coverage

for

Baum

in

connection

with

the

accident.

Slingerland blatantly and erroneously asserts that the Motion to
Set Aside the Default and the arguments in favor of said Motion
were all made by "USF&G" and not Baum.

(R. 180-196).

Not only were Slingerland's "straw man" attacks against USF&G
improper, apparently they were also successful. In denying Baum's
Motion for the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
the trial court stated:
The court declines to further enter Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Mr. Olsen's
response [the Memorandum attacking USF&G] in
behalf of the plaintiff is sufficient.
(R. 0217).
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to
set aside the Default and Default Judgment against Baum under the
provisions of Rule 60(b) and compounded that error by stating that
the basis for denying Baum's Motion was Slingerland's "straw man"
attack against USF&G, a non-party in this case.

13

CONCLUSION
The Default and Default Judgment in this case, entered against
Baum in the amount of almost $6 million, took place at a time that
Baum was emotionally distraught, extremely confused and of the
mistaken understanding that he had no choice and no options other
than to do nothing.

Due to this excusable neglect, the Default

Judgment was entered against him.

When informed of his mistake,

Baum filed a timely Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default
Judgment.

Slingerland never claimed prejudice should the Default

be set aside and instead, proceeded with attacks against USF&G as
a basis for denying Baum's Motion.
The courts in Utah have always disfavored Default Judgments.
In this instance, Baum should have the opportunity to defend the
claim of sole liability for Slingerland's injuries and damages.
Rule 60(b) was intended for situations such as Baum's and the trial
court erred and abused its discretion in failing and refusing to
set the Default and Default Judgment aside.
DATED this 26th day of March, 1993. i
KIPP

endant/Appe11ant
Baum
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ADDENDUM
1.

Rule 60(b)

2.

Default Certificate

3•

Judgment

4.

Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment

5.

Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment

6.

Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum

7.

Memorandum in Opposition to USF&G's Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment

8.

Response Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Setting
Aside Default and Default Judgment

9.

Minute Entry Denying Motion to Set Aside Default and Default
Judgment

10.

order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment

11.

objection to Proposed Order

12.

Minute Entry Denying Defendant's objection to Proposed Order

13.

Order Denying Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order

14.

Notice of Appeal
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of March, 1993, I caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
David R. Olsen, Esq.
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480,
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or othui
jarts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
ye corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
my party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the peniency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newiy discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
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DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458)
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (496!)
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL U1S1K1CI COURT WW '•.'. I. I I '. KT. COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TOBY SCOTT SLIN>
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE

(" ' "

92-0900571PI

Judge: Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.

OOUGLAS M. BAUM, having been regularly served with process in this
action, and having failed to appear and answer the plaintu, * Lo.:.r~

;

time allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of defendant, DOUGLAS M.
BAUM, is hereby entered according to law.
ATTEST my „„.«..

-

/ #

day of

IW2.

By:
DR018.94

t'/lAlfjAJ

//.

KL&Q-

I,ill

DAVID R. OLSEN, E$g. (z<*3oj
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (4961)
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG * 11AII' .* -N
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiff

, I

* .^
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IN i /IE DTIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE ('(MINTY

r J \ KTWCSoi
uiHV' *Ji o n ' •?! INGERLAND,

)
)

^ ^ S
JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)

vs
LAS M. BAUM,

Civil No. 920900571PI

)
)

Defendant.

This matter came on for trial June 16, 1992 on the
heard the testimony or witnesses -uul I<\ nv

Slingerlanu

ftlulnu

_<jurt

Plaintiff waived the need

to make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Now, being f"1
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

(^iT^^^

>l n

'.I'III

^.

""—rt
,,

(n I ' H F K D Uul the plaintiff Toby Sum

w,inlr<1 judgment against the defendant Douglas M. Baum as follows:
Special damages:

$4,6.''•, \>''" H).

General damages.

SI.000.000.00.

Total damages:

$5.623.839.00.

This judgment shall bear interest at therateof 12% per annum from the date of entry until paid
in full.
DATED this

/7^"

day of June, 1992.

DAVID S. Y
Judge, Third
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Tab 4

HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 920900571PI

DOUGLAS M. BAUM,
Defendant.

Judge David S. Young

Defendant, Douglas M. Baum, by and through his counsel, Heinz
J. Mahler, Esg., of Kipp and Christian, P.C, hereby moves this
court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1) (7), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, to set aside the default and default judgment
entered on or about June 16, 1992.
This Motion is based upon the accompanying Memorandum of
Authorities and Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum which establishes that
the judgment should be set aside and the matters at issue litigated
in the interest of justice and fairness.
DATED this *fo day of September, 1992.
KIPP ANDCpRISTIAN, P.C.

Attorney/for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAIEJNg
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the [(Htx- day of September, 1992,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid,
to the following:
David R. Olsen, Esq.
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

§yLL^$L<\ J . Avi
OtJL
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Tab 5

HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 920900571PI

DOUGLAS M. BAUM,
Defendant.

Judge David S. Young

Defendant, Douglas M. Baum (Baum), submits the following
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of his Motion to Set Aside the
Default and Default Judgment of June 16, 1992:
FACTS
1.

On June 1, 1991, defendant, Douglas M. Baum, was

driving a 1981 Subaru near Delle, Utah, with a passenger, Toby
Slingerland, the plaintiff.

The automobile was involved in a one

car rollover as a result of which the plaintiff was seriously
injured.

2.

On January 31, 1992, plaintiff filed this action

against Baum seeking damages for injuries sustained in the accident
in question.
3.

Baum failed to answer or otherwise respond to the

Complaint filed against him due to Baum's understanding that no
insurance company would
reasonable alternative.
4.

cover the claim and that he had no
(Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum)

A Certificate of Default was entered May 18, 1992

and, subsequent to a hearing, a Default Judgment was entered on
June 16, 1992, in the amount of $5,623,839.00.
ARGUMENT
Rule 60(b) contemplates setting aside judgments such as
this on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, or
other reasons in the furtherance of justice and equity.

In this

matter, Baum is being sued by his friend due to severe injuries
sustained by Slingerland in a one car rollover accident.

At the

time an Answer or other response was due by Baum, Baum understood
that no insurance company would cover the claim in question or
provide a defense on his behalf.

Baum is 22 years old, has never

been sued before, and is not sophisticated as to issues of law.
The attorney he consulted advised him that liability was likely and
that bankruptcy may be his best alternative. Baum felt sorrow for
the

injuries his friend

sustained.
-2-

Accordingly,

under the

circumstances, Baura took no action and the default and default
judgment were entered.
The injuries claimed by Slingerland are substantial and
serious.

Defendant respectfully submits that it does not further

the interest of justice and equity to allow a default judgment of
$5.6 million to stand without having both sides of the controversy
heard.

It would be in the further interest of justice and equity

to introduce evidence as to whether or not the acts or omissions on
the

part

of Baum which resulted

in

the accident constitute

w

negligence11 or other "fault" resulting in liability on the part of

Baum for Slingerland's damages and injuries. It is further in the
interest of justice to litigate specifically the nature and extent
of the plaintiff's injuries giving defendant a fair opportunity to
examine the treating physicians of the plaintiff, to have independent evaluations by other physicians concerning plaintiff's future
care and treatment, as well as examining the economic damages such
as lost wages and earning capacity, etc.
Baum took no action in responding to the Complaint in
part because of his understanding that no insurance company was
willing to provide coverage or provide a defense. At present the
matter of insurance coverage for Baum in connection with this claim
is the subject of litigation in the matter entitled USF&G v. Baum,

-3-

et al, filed in the United States District Court, District of Utah,
Civil No. 2-92-CV-611J.

(Affidavit of Douglas M. Baura)

The courts in Utah and elsewhere have traditionally
disfavored the entry of judgments by default. Entry of judgment by
default denies a defendant to present his side of the story, to
present a defense, and to

fairly and equitably

examine the

plaintiff's damage claims*
In Westinahouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Larsen Contractor,
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975), the court stated:
. . . courts generally tend to favor granting
relief from default judgment where there is
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result
in substantial prejudice or injustice to the
adverse party,
CONCLUSION
Defendant, Douglas M. Baum, respectfully requests an
opportunity to be heard, to present a defense to the claim of
liability against him, and the opportunity to examine the plaintiff
and his treating physicians and other witnesses in connection with
his claim for damages.

These matters are in dispute, an actual

controversy exists as to these issues, and justice and equity would
be better served if both sides have an opportunity to be heard in
a matter involving a $5.6 million claim.

Accordingly, defendant

respectfully requests that the default and default judgment,
entered less than 90 days ago, be set aside, that defendant be
-4-

allowed to answer the Complaint and provide a defense to the
allegations in question.
4h
3»4

day of September, 1992.
TIAN, P.C.

HLER, ESQ.
or Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

/ffi^day of September, 1992,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of
Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default and Default
Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
David R. Olsen, Esq.
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

sQ^^h/
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HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C
Attorneys for Defendant
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,

:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUGLAS M. BAUM

vs.

:

Civil No. 920900571PI

DOUGLAS M. BAUM,

:

Judge David S. Young

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

(State of Utah
(County of Salt Lake

:

)
: ss
)

I, Douglas M. Baum, being first duly sworn, depose and state
as follows:
1.

I am the defendant in this lawsuit and have personal

knowledge concerning the matters testified of herein.
2.

On June

1, 1991, I was driving my car with Toby

Slingerland as a passenger.

I momentarily fell asleep, the car

rolled, and Toby Slingerland was seriously injured in the accident.

3.

Shortly after the accident, I contacted USF&G Insurance

Company notifying them about the accident and requesting coverage*
4.

I was informed by USF&G that they would not cover this

accident.
5.

Subsequently, I was

served with a Summons

and the

Complaint in this lawsuit.
6.

Because I was told that there was no coverage and because

the lawsuit was filed against me by my best friend, I felt that
there was nothing that I could do and, therefore, under the
circumstances, I took no action.
7.

I have never been sued before and I do not fully

understand how the legal process works.
8.

I talked to Dave Olsen, Toby Slingerland's lawyer, and as

a result of these conversations, I was of the understanding that he
would try to work things out with the insurance company as to
coverage for Toby SIingerland's claim.
9.

I also talked to a lawyer who advised me that liability

is almost certain and that since the claim does not involve conduct
that is non-dischargeable, that probably my best option would be to
eventually file for bankruptcy.
10.

Judgment was entered against me on June 16, 1992. I did

not take any action to prevent judgment from being entered because
I did not believe I had any viable options.
2

11.

Subsequently, a lawsuit has been filed by USF&G against

me and a Counterclaim has been filed by me in the case entitled
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company vs. Douglas M. Baumr et
al. and Douglas M- Baum, and Douglas H. Baum vs. USF&G. in the
United

States

District

Court,

District

of Utah,

Civil No.

2-92-CV-611J, as to whether or not I have insurance coverage.
12.

With the situation now changed, and in order to protect

my interests, I am asking that the default judgment be set aside
and that I be given the opportunity to defend myself and let a jury
decide whether or not my actions constitute negligence.

I would

also like an opportunity to have my attorney examine the evidence
and if appropriate, present my own witnesses on the damage claim of
Toby Slingerland.
13.

Further, affiant saith naught.

Dated this

'1»V day of September, 1992.

.* -'-SUBSCRIBEDJ^H£«ORN TO before me this \l-tU^ day of September,
• ^~.^\

Notary Pubflo
!
173 East 400 South 1330 I

My Commission Expires:
s) ,
I~o
"l'$lCi?

LJAAs*~4rC~ M2l
Notary P u b l i c
Residing at: <£jb* £Ju, Uv^Jry^3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of September, 1992, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of
Douglas M. Baum to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
David R. Olsen, Esq.
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

fc*x^L~ Ad

4

Tab 7

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS M. BAUM,

Civil No. 920900571PI
Judge: David S. Young

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
USF&G'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458)
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (4961)
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Plaintiff, Toby Slingerland, is a twenty-one-year-old quadriplegic. Toby
Slingerland, while riding as a passenger, was paralyzed in a single-car accident on June
1, 1991. Defendant Douglas M. Baum was the driver of that car. Baum drove off the
highway and his car overturned. On January 31, 1992, Toby Slingerland sued Douglas
Baum for the injuries which he sustained in that accident.
Douglas M. Baum failed to answer or otherwise enter a defense to Toby
Slingerland's Complaint. Baum's decision not to appear and answer was based upon the
actions of his insurance carrier. Douglas M. Baum's insurance carrier is United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company (MUSF&G"). Baum was insured under a USF&G policy
with limits of $100,000.00. USF&G three times denied coverage to Douglas M. Baum
for the accident in which Toby Slingerland was paralyzed. Consequently, Baum assumed
there was nothing he could do under the circumstances and he took no action to defend
against the Complaint.
But Baum's decision was not made in a vacuum. He consulted an attorney
who advised Baum that liability was "almost certain." Thus, rather than appear and
defend at his own expense, Baum opted to allow default to be entered and to eventually
file for bankruptcy. Default was entered against Baum by this Court on May 18, 1992.
On June 16, 1992, a trial on the issue of Toby Slingerland's damages was
held before this Court. After hearing the testimony of witnesses and receiving exhibits
into evidence, this Court entered judgment in favor of Toby Slingerland for
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$5,623,839.00. USF&G attended the June 16, 1992 trial. During that trial, this Court
repeatedly offered USF&G the opportunity to participate in those proceedings. USF&G,
however, refused the offer.
On July 9, 1992, USF&G brought an action for declaratory relief against
Douglas M. Baum, his father Douglas H. Baum, and Toby Slingerland in the United
States District Court for the Central District of Utah.

USF&G brought that action

seeking a ruling from the federal court that it had no coverage or defense obligations to
Douglas M. Baum and his father Douglas H. Baum with respect to Toby Slingerland's
claims. On August 18, 1992, Douglas M. Baum and his father counterclaimed in that
federal court action against USF&G. In that counterclaim, the Baum's are seeking
damages for USF&G's bad faith in refusing to settle Toby Slingerland's claims for the
policy limits of $100,000.00.
Immediately after that counterclaim was filed, USF&G retained counsel to
represent Douglas M. Baum before this Court. Through this counsel, USF&G has filed
a Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment. Toby Slingerland is submitting this
Memorandum in opposition to USF&G's "Motion to Set Aside Default and Default
Judgment."

-2-

I.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Set out hereinbelow in separately numbered paragraphs are the material facts
which this Court needs to consider in ruling on USF&G's Motion. Prior to reviewing
those facts, however, the Court needs to be aware of the background of law against which
these facts must be considered and weighed. Specifically, the law developed under Utah
Rule Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (7).
A.

Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure 6 0 < W n And CD.
USF&G has moved under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (7) to set

aside the Certificate of Default and Judgment entered by this Court against Douglas M.
Baum. Rule 60(b) provides that this Court "may in the furtherance of justice"
relieve a party or his legal representative from afinaljudgment, order or proceeding for

the following reasons: "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect;" . . . "or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment." Utah Rules Civ. Pro. 60(b)(1) and (7). (Emphasis added). With
respect to motions brought under Rule 60(b)(1), they must be brought "not more than
three months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken." Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(b). Motions brought under Rule 60(b)(7) must be brought within a reasonable
time. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, however, that a motion under Rule
-3-

60(b)(7) may not be used to circumvent the three-month filing period for "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). In other words, if the
Motion should have been brought within three months of the entry of the order or
judgment, a defendant cannot extend that time period by captioning its Motion as a Rule
60(b)(7) Motion rather than a Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. See Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d
52 (1984).
In order to prevail on its Motion under Rule 60(b)(1), USF&G must show
that the Certificate of Default and/or Judgment was entered against Douglas M. Baum
through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, that its Motion is timely and
that Baum has a meritorious defense to Toby Slingerland claims. £g£ State by and
through D. ofS.S. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983). To prevail on
its Motion brought under Rule 60(b)(7), USF&G must show that the reason for setting
aside the Certificate of Default and/or Judgment is one other than those listed in
subdivisions (1) through (6) of Rule 60(b); that this other reason is sufficient to justify
relief from the Certificate of Default and/or Judgment; and that its Motion was brought
within a reasonable time after entry of the Certificate of Default and/or Judgment.
Finally, whether it is proceeding under Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(7), USF&G has the
burden of establishing the grounds for setting aside the Certificate of Default and/or

Judgment by "clear and convincing evidence/
155 (Colo. App. 1988).
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Salle v. Howe, 151 P.2d 154,

B.

Material Facts.
1.

On June 1, 1991, Douglas M. Baum was driving a car in which Toby

Slingerland was a passenger. Baum drove off the road and the car rolled over. Toby
Slingerland became a quadriplegic as a result of injuries he received in that accident.
Toby Slingerland^ condition is permanent and will require extensive future medical and
maintenance costs.
2.

In the Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum — the only evidence that

USF&G submits in support of its Motion — Baum states that shortly after the accident,
he contacted USF&G notifying them about the accident and requesting coverage. Baum

further states he: "Was informed by USF&G that they would not cover this
accident." (Baum Affidavit, ff 3 and 4). (Emphasis added).
3.

Baum also states in his Affidavit that he was subsequently served with

Toby Slingerland's Summons and Complaint; and that because he already had been told
by USF&G that there was no coverage, "I felt that there was nothing I could
do."

Consequently, Baum says he "took no action."

(Baum Affidavit 1 6).

(Emphasis added).
4.

Baum nonetheless asks in his Affidavit that "a jury [be allowed to]

decide whether or not my actions constitute negligence." But Baum offers no evidence
that would relieve him of responsibility for this accident. Instead, Baum admits liability
stating that he was the driver of the car and that H[I] momentarily fell asleep, the car
-5-

rolled and Toby Slingerland was seriously injured in the accident." (Baum Affidavit, 5
2). Baum likewise requests an opportunity for his USF&G counsel to "examine the
evidence and if appropriate, present my own witnesses on the damage claim of Toby
Slingerland." (Baum Affidavit, f 12). Again, Baum does not state what if any evidence
he intends to proffer on the issue of Toby Slingerland's damages.
5.

Baum states in his Affidavit that USF&G denied coverage for Toby

Slingerland's claim. Baum neglects to include in his Affidavit the fact that USF&G
attended the June 16, 1992 trial and that during the trial USF&G was given the
opportunity by this Court to participate.
6.

USF&G subsequently brought an action for declaratory relief against

Douglas M. Baum, his father Douglas H. Baum and Toby Slingerland in the United
States District Court for the Central District of Utah on July 9, 1992. In that action,
USF&G is asking the federal court to declare that it owed no coverage or defense
obligations to the Baums with respect to Toby Slingerland's claims.
7.

The Baum's counterclaimed against USF&G on August 18, 1992.

In their Counterclaim, Douglas M. Baum and Douglas H. Baum sued USF&G for the
insurance carrier's bad faith refusal to settle Toby Slingerland's claims for the
$100,000.00 policy limit.

-6-

n.
ARGUMENT: USF&G HAS FATT.Fn TO
MEET ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS
NECESSARY FOR THIS COURT TO
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT A N D
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b)(1)
In order for USF&G to prevail on its Rule 60(b)(1) Motion, it must show:
[T]hat the judgment was entered against him through
excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in
Rule 60(b)[l]), . . . that his motion to set aside the
judgment was timely; and (3) that he [Baum] has a
meritorious defense to the action.
Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56. USF&G must meet this burden with "clear and
convincing evidence." Salle, 757 P.2d at 155. (Emphasis added). But USF&G has
failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to all three elements required to set aside
a judgment or order under Rule 60(b)(1).

A.

USF&G Has Not Met Its Burden To Show That The Default
And/Or Judgment Were Entered As A Result Of Mistake,
Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect On The Part Of
Douglas M. Baum.
The only evidence USF&G offers to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise

or excusable neglect is the Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum. Yet the facts stated in Baum's
Affidavit do notriseto the level of a mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect
sufficient for this Court to vacate orders and/or judgments under Rule 60(b)(1). Baum,
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for example, states in his Affidavit that he was told by USF&G that there was no
coverage. Hence, he "felt that there was nothing that I could d o /

(Baum

Affidavit, f 6). (Emphasis added).
Baum also states in his Affidavit — and it is an important admission — that
before making the decision to do nothing he:
[A]lso talked to a lawyer who advised me that
liability is almost certain and that since the claim
does not involve conduct that is non-dischargeable, that
probably my best option would be to eventually file for
bankruptcy.
(Baum Affidavit, \ 9). (Emphasis added). Baum thus weighed the option of going to the
personal expense of hiring an attorney to defend himself on a claim of liability he now
admits "is almost certain" against saving the cost of an attorney by not appearing and
defending and then later discharging the Judgment through bankruptcy. Baum's decision
not to appear and defend was thus an informed, reasoned choice, which hardly constitutes
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
Moreover, Baum was placed in the position of making that choice because
of USF&G's wrongful denial of coverage. While USF&G may not now be happy with
Baum's choice to do nothing, this insurance company had ample opportunity to intervene
on Baum's behalf prior to entry of the Judgment but knowingly chose not to. Having
made that choice, USF&G cannot go back and undo its decision under the guise of
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." At best, the facts which USF&G
-8-

puts forth in support of its Rule 60(b)(1) Motion show indifference and a lack of diligence
on its part, which are not grounds for vacating a Judgment or Order of this Court. See
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984) (affirming entry of default judgment
in similar case in which defendant felt no need to respond to the Complaint filed against
him).

B-

USF&G's Motion To Set Aside The Certificate Of Default
Is Untimely.
Rule 60(b)(1) is clear on its face. A motion to set aside an order or other

proceeding on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect must be

brought "not more than three months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken/ Utah Rule Civ. P. 60(b)(1). (Emphasis added). In the
instant case, the Certificate of Default was entered on May 18, 1992, but USF&G's
Motion was not filed until September 11, 1992. USF&G's Motion to Set Aside the
Default was not filed until almost four months after entry of default and, therefore, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to vacate that order of default under Rule 60(b)(1) upon the
defendant meeting the standards set forth in Utah Rule Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

C.

USF&G Has Failed To Meet Its Burden To Show That
Baum Has A Meritorious Defense.
The third element which USF&G must meet in order to prevail on its Rule

60(b)(1) Motion is a showing that Douglas M. Baum has a meritorious defense to Toby
-9-

Slingerland's claims. This USF&G has not done. Nor could USF&G do so under the
facts in this case. Douglas M. Baum clearly states in his Affidavit that he went to sleep
and drove off the road (Baum Affidavit, S 2) and that he was advised by his attorney that
"liability is almost certain.11 (Baum Affidavit, 1 9). (Emphasis added). USF&G
offers no facts to contradict this admission. Rather than a proffer of evidence showing
a meritorious defense to Toby Slingerland's negligence claims, Baum simply states in his
Affidavit that he now desires "the opportunity to defend myself and let a jury decide
whether or not my actions constitute negligence.M (Baum Affidavit, f 12).
Similarly, Baum offers in his Affidavit no indication of a meritorious
defense to Toby Slingerland's damage claims. Baum instead simply states in conclusory
fashion that:

I would like also an opportunity to have my
attorney examine the evidence and if appropriate,
present my own witnesses on the damage claim of
Toby Slingerland.
(Baum Affidavit, 1 12). (Emphasis added). USF&G does not say what evidence it
would present on Baum's behalf in contradiction of Toby Slingerland's damage claims.
Furthermore, the existence of any such evidence is indeed doubtful. The Court will
recall the powerful testimony and other evidence of Toby Slingerland's damages that were
presented during trial, and having heard this evidence the Court knows that it cannot be
contradicted.
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in.
ARGUMENT: USF&G HAS FAILED TO MEET
ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY
FOR THIS COURT TO SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT AND JUDGMENT
UNDER RULE 60(b)(1)
USF&G has likewise moved to set aside the Default and Judgment on the
basis of Rule 60(b)(7), This rule allows the Court to vacate orders and judgments for
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.M Utah Rule Civ.
Pro. 60(b)(7). Rule 60(b)(7) is not, however, a substitute for motions brought under Rule
60(b)(1). See Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195 (Rule 60(b)(7) may not be resorted to for relief
when the ground asserted falls within Rule 60(b)(1)). In fact, the "any other reason
justifying relief language of 60(b)(7) is actually the residuary clause under which
USF&G must show:
[TJhat the reason [for relief] . . . [is] one other than
those listed in subdivisions (1) through (6); . . . that
the reason[s given] justify relief; and . . . that the
motion . . . [was] made within a reasonable time.
Thorpe v. Jensen, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 1991).
USF&G also has the burden of establishing grounds for relief under Rule
60(b)(7) with "clear and convincing evidence. w Salle, 757 P.2d at 155. (Emphasis
added). But once more USF&G has not met its burden. USF&G offers no evidence
showing "any other reason justifying relief" under Rule 60(b)(7). More importantly, the
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Utah Court of Appeals has cautioned that in applying Rule 60(b)(7) lower courts should
proceed "very cautiously;" that these grounds for vacating orders and judgments should
be used "sparingly;" and that relief from orders and judgments under Rule 60(b)(7)
should occur "only in unusual and exceptional circumstances." Thorpe v. Jensen, 817
P.2d at 387 (Utah App. 1991). In the instant case, USF&G has failed to identify any
reason justifying the relief it requests.

IV.
CONCLUSION
USF&G has failed to meet its burden of proof on the Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment. USF&G has failed to provide the Court with clear and
convincing evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or any other
reason justifying relief under Rules 60(b)(1) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to the Certificate of Default, USF&G's Motion is likewise untimely, having
been brought more than three months after that default was entered. Lastly, USF&G has
failed to make any showing that Baum has a meritorious defense to the underlying action.
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DATED this 22nd day of September, 1992.

>

^

f-

rid R. Olsen, Esq,
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to be hand-delivered this 22nd day of September, 1992, to:
Heinz J. Mahler, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314

r-i
JCT59.38
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Tab 8

HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,

RESPONSE MEMORANDUM TO
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
OPPOSING SETTING ASIDE
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 920900571PI

DOUGLAS M. BAUM,

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

Defendant Douglas M. Baum submits this Response to
Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Setting Aside the Default and
Default Judgment:

ARGUMENT
It should first be noted that plaintiff's Memorandum is
entitled Memorandum in Opposition to "USF&G's" Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment.

The entire memorandum contains

arguments against "USF&G", concluding with the statement that
"USF&G" has failed to meet its burden and that "USF&G's" Motion to
Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment should be denied. USF&G
is not a party in this lawsuit.

The Motion to Set Aside Default

and Default Judgment was filed by Douglas M. Baum, the defendant,
and not USF&G.

Since the entire memorandum is directed against

USF&G and not against the defendant who is seeking to set aside
this default, all arguments in the memorandum are without merit,
are directed against a non-party, and should not be considered by
this court.
The Affidavit of defendant Douglas M. Baum honestly and
clearly presents to the court the circumstances, under which a
default judgment was entered.

Mr. Baum is a young man who was

faced with a situation where he was being sued by his best friend
who had sustained serious injuries in an auto accident.

Mr. Baum

is unsophisticated in connection with legal matters and has never
been involved in a lawsuit. Mr. Baum was advised by USF&G that no
coverage was provided for this claim. As a result of conversations
with Dave Olsen, plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Baum was of the understanding that Mr. Olson would attempt to work things out with USF&G
in connection with coverage for Toby SIingerland's claim.

In

reviewing this matter with an attorney, Mr. Baum was advised that
liability was almost certain and that perhaps his best option would
be to eventually file for bankruptcy.

Given these facts as a

whole, it is not difficult to understand why when subsequently
served with a Summons and Complaint, that Mr. Baum took no action
and allowed the default judgment to be entered against him, which
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situation constitutes excusable neglect on the part of Mr. Baum and
was due in part to mistaken beliefs on the part of Mr. Baum.
Litigation is now pending between Mr. Baum, USF&G, and
others as to whether or not the claim of Mr. Slingerland is covered
by a policy of insurance.

Defense counsel has now been retained

for Mr. Baum and thus, Mr. Baum respectfully requests that this
court allow him to proceed with reasonable discovery and put on a
reasonable defense.
In his memorandum, plaintiff claims that Baum has failed
to provide any "evidence" as a basis for challenging liability or
damages. This argument is, however, without basis in logic. Baum
cannot provide any evidence unless he is given an opportunity to
proceed with discovery.

There is no doubt that the plaintiff

suffered significant damages. However, the extent of those damages
has only been presented by one side.

Mr. Baum should have the

opportunity to cross-examine the treating physicians and other
witnesses that will testify or have knowledge concerning Mr.
Slingerland's injury and how it will effect the balance of his
life, as well as all witnesses in connection with economic damages.
Mr. Baum should have the opportunity, if appropriate, to provide
his own witnesses on the issue of medical and economic damages.
Plaintiff also claims that Mr. Baum does not have a
meritorious defense. That is a question that should be left for a
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jury to decide.

Although Mr. Baum was driving the vehicle at the

time of the accident, Mr. Baum and Mr. Slingerland jointly agreed
and decided to make a late night trip to Wendover, both decided to
go a substantial period of time without sleep, and it was by
agreement that Mr. Baum was driving at the time the accident. The
factors which contributed to Mr. Baum falling asleep resulting in
the accident were joint decisions by both Mr. Slingerland and Mr.
Baum. The causes which resulted in the accident were the result of
mutual agreements. A jury should have the opportunity to determine
whether or not Mr. Slingerland is partially at fault and to what
degree for the causes that resulted in the accident.

Further, it

should be a question for the jury as to whether or not Mr. Baum's
falling asleep under the circumstances rises to the level of
"negligence" under instructions to be given to a jury.
Mr. Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default
Judgment was made within 90 days of the time that the Default
Judgment was entered and within a reasonable time of the Default
Certificate

having

been

signed

by

the

clerk

of

the court.

Plaintiff has not shown, nor has he even claimed in his Memorandum,
any prejudice that would result if the default is set' aside.
Plaintiff's claim will still be viable.

It would be subject to

proof and cross-examination. Mr. Baum respectfully submits that it
would be in the interest of justice to set aside the default
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judgment in light of the facts as outlined above and in light of
the substantial amount of damages at issue and that he be given an
opportunity to provide a defense to this claim. Defendant's Motion
to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment should, therefore, be
granted•
DATED this <3S

day of September, 1992.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

1, ESQ.
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF WAIXJNq
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ppfcCday of September, 1992,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response
Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Setting Aside Default
and

Default

Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the

following:
David R. Olsen, Esq.
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

<^4JL^A^ J^iffyt X f l - ^ ^
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Tab 9

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
SLINGERLAND, TOBY SCOTT
PLAINTIFF
VS
BAUM, DOUGLAS M

CASE NUMBER 920900571 PI
DATE 10/07/92
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. OLSEN, DAVID R.
D. ATTY. MAHLER, H.; JOHNSON, G.;
SWORN AND EXAMINED
OTHERS; JACKSON, W. K.

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
ENTERED IS DENIED. THE COURT HAS REVIEWED THE PLEADINGS AND IS
CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NO APPROPRIATE BASIS UNDER RULE 60 (B)
TO GRANT THE MOTION. ALL CONCERNED WERE WELL AWARE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS, OR REASONABLY COULD HAVE BEEN WITH PROPER ATTENTION
AND THUS THE MOTION IS DENIED. MR. OLSEN IS REQUESTED TO
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT HEREWITH AND WITH HIS PLEADINGS.
ORAL ARGUMENT ON THE MOTION IS DENIED. THE COURT FEELS
THAT THE MATTER HAS BEEN FULLY BRIEFED AND CAN BE THUS SUBMITTED
ON THE PLEADINGS.
C.C. TO COUNSEL

Tab 10

DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458)
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (4961)
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS M. BAUM,
Defendant.

]
I
]
)
)
]
1
]

ORDER

Civil No. 920900571PI
Judge: David S. Young

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment was duly
considered by the Court. The parties filed memoranda and affidavits in support of their
respective positions. The Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment be, and the same hereby is, denied.
DATED this _ / 2 _ _ l _ day of October, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

M
DAVID S. YOUNG

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to
be mailed, first chss postage prepaid, this ft

day of October, 1992, to:

Heinz J. Mahler, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Gary L. Johnson, Esq.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
W. Kevin Jackson, Esq.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

>r<%:

DRO20.ll
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Tab 1.1

HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
City Centre I f #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DJ STRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,

:
:

Plaintiff,

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
ORDER

•

vs.

:

DOUGLAS M. BAUM,

:

Civil No, 920900571PI

:

Judge David S. Young

Defendant•

Defendant Douglas M. Baum objects

plaintiff# s proposed

Order denying defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default a.MJ Default
Judgment,

which Order has been

submitted

by plaintiff.

This

Objection is based upon the fact that the Order is not sufficiently
definite and clear In outlining the court's basis and facts relied
upon in denying the Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default
Judgment.
This court

; its discretion under Rule S2, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure,
Conclusions of Law

ente, specific Findings of fact dud

Defendant respectfully r< quests that the court

enter specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law providing in
detail the facts upon which the court relied and based its denial
of

defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default

Judgment.
DATED this

day of , 1992.
JSTIAN, P.C.

ER, ESQ.
for Defendant

CgRTIFICATB QF H M M W g
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the <^LJ~day of October, 1992,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to
Proposed Order to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
David R. Olsen, Esq.
Jesse C Trentadue, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

IS/UL^SU..
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Tab 1J

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
SLINGERLAND, TOBY SCOTT
PLAINTIFF
VS
BAUM, DOUGLAS M

CASE NUMBER 920900571 PI
DATE 11/05/93
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. OLSEN, DAVID R.
D. ATTY. MAHLER, HEINZ J.

THE NOTICE TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S "OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
ORDER" HAS BEEN FILED NOVEMBER 2, 1992. THE COURT DECLINES TO
FURTHER ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
MR. OLSEN'S RESPONSE IN BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF IS SUFFICIENT.
THE OBJECTIONS ARE DENIED. MR. OLSEN IS REQUESTED TO PREPARE
AN ORDER CONSISTENT HEREWITH AND WITH HIS PLEADINGS ON FILE.
C.C. TO COUNSEL

Tab 13

DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458)
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (4961)
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801)532-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
I
]I

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER

;

DOUGLAS M. BAUM,
Defendant.

i
)
i

Civil No. 920900571PI
Judge: David S. Young

]

Defendants Objection to the Proposed Order was filed in this Court on October
21, 1992. A Notice to Submit was filed on November 2, 1992. The Court being fully advised
in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

Defendant's Objection to the Proposed Order is denied.

2.

The Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default and Default

Judgment shall be deemed signed and entered effective as of the date of this Order Denying
Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order.

DATED this

I

day of ^November, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to
be mailed, first class postage prepaid, this 12th day of November, 1992, to:
Heinz J. Mahler, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Gary L. Johnson, Esq.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
W. Kevin Jackson, Esq.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DRO20.26
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Tab 14

HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS M. BAUM,
Defendant.

Civil No* 920900571PI
Judge David S. Young

Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant, Douglas
M. Baum, through counsel, Heinz J. Mahler of Kipp and Christian,
P . C , appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the Default and Default
Judgment entered against defendant on June 17, 1992 and final Order
denying defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default

and Default

Judgment entered in this matter on October 19, 1992. Defendant's
Rule 52(b) Motion filed in connection with said Order was denied on
December 1, 1992.
The Appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
DATED this

1ft4** day of December, 1992.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

Hein^HJl tffflftler
Attorneyyfor defendant
Douglas Baum

CERTIFICATE QF HAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _sE**-day of December, 1992, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to
be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
David R. Olsen, Esq.
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
W. Kevin Jackson
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
311 South State Street
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

§^x**jl*~ /*M(
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1 J X « T OF THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
„ THE DISTRICT COURT OF TO
STATE OF UTAH
UNDERTAKING
T0 by

Plaintiff

Scott SUngerland

FOB
COSTS ON APFKAL

VS.

Case 1920900571PI
Defendant

Douglas M. Bauo
WHEREAS, the

Defendant
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day of
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) . coats, and interest at
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Dated and signed this
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day of
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EUMBETH POTTS
8th
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CERTIFIED COPY

GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
NO..J5.2?7.
Kncm mU M*n bf liUee Fru*nt$$
That UNITED STATES FIDEUTY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, a corporation organised and existing under the laws of the
State of Maryland, and having iu principal office at the City of Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, does hereby coiutitute and appoint

Kenneth Osborne
#f the Qty of

S a l t Lake C i t y

, State ef

iu true and lawful attorney » in and for the State

of

Utah

Utah

for the following purposee, to wit!
To sign iu name aa surety to, and to execute, aeal and acknowledge any and all bonds, and to respectrrely do and perform any tad
all ecu and things tot forth in the resolution of the Board of Director* of the aaid UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY
COMPANY, a certified copy of which i* hereto annexed and made a pari of Ode Power of Attorney} and the said UNITED STATEScr
FIDEUTY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, through ua» iu Board of Directors, hereby ratine* and confirm* all and whatsoever the aaid '

Kenneth Osborne

. - -$•.*

^ \ \ vi~

-

- „ x

••__.

ftuy Uwinlly & la the prendsei by vlrtne
\ 4
^ \
•
. Lm
In JTtoteM Whttof, the aaid UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY, COMPANY hag caused thla wttrmnent to bo
sealed with it* corporate aeal duly attested by the eignaturee ofteVioe-PreakSent and AtaiaUftt Secretary, this
17th
day el

January

. A. a 19 7 5
UNITED STATES FIDEUTY AND GUARANTY COMPANY.

(Signed)

*....&»-*&?&•
Vlc+PruU**.

(SEAL>

(Signed)

t..,.,W«wP..RUyaPd

Wf

/.„w*.„

Assistaai Stcrttary.
STATE OP MARYLAND,
BALTIMORE CITY,

}

* mt

^"OaUfr
3.7th^P
day of
January
• * • a » 7 5 t before me personally came
J o h n H a m i l t o n * * * ***
f Vlen-Preeideiit cl the UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY
COMPANY and
W* G* H i l y a r d
. Assistant Secretary of said Company, with both of
whom I am personally acquainted, who being by me severally dnly sworn, aaid that they residedfatthe City of Baltimore, Maryland;
that they, the said
John H t a n i l t o n .
end Wo 0 # H i l y a r d
were retpeotMr
t h V ^ c i i ^ i d e n l and the Aedataut Secretary of the said UNITED STATES rTDEUTlUNOcCUARArfrY COMPANY, the coa>
ooratioo described in and which executed the foregoing Power el Attorney r that they jack knew% the. seal j>( sald,corporetiott;.that jh».
seal affixed to said Power of Attorney waVtneh corporate sealths^towaaaoraedbyorderefthe Boeyl of Director* of sam^corpor*>
* » , and that they signed .their namea thereto by Eke order at Vice-President and Assistant Secretary, respocthrely, of thet Company.
My commission expires thefirstday in Jaiy, A. IX 19.1W...-

(Signed)

(SEAL)

Herbe^.^.AUtt

> „..„
Notary Public.

STATE OF MARYLAND,C 1

BALTIMORE CITY.
J
Set
L
R o b e r t H. B0U8e
t Clerk of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, which Courtvk A
Court of Record, and has a seal, do hereby certify that
Herbert Js AtOl
• Esquire, before
whom the annexed affidavits were made, and who haa thereto subscribed his name, was at die time of so doing a Notary Public of the
* . t « «f Marrhmd. in and for the Oty of Baltimore, duly conunisaiooed and sworn and authored by law to administer otths and take
! ^ o w l e ^ n Z or proof of deeds to be recorded therein. I further certify that I am acquainted with the handwriting of the aaid
Notary, and verily bcBevt the signature to be hie genuine signature.
lis Tertnumy WUrtolt I hereto set my hand and ami the seal of the Superior Court of Baltimore Gty, the same being a Court

of Record, this
s «•«« A V ft

l?th

day of

January
i« M »4i

.A. IX 1975
*$»#.*•.*»&•

